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Middle East

How the Middle East is really being remade

By Nir Rosen

BAGHDAD - A few weeks prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US Council of Foreign Relations held a dinner attended mostly by thirtysomething PhDs to discuss the intended consequences of the war. The participants were exuberant about the opportunity liberating Iraq presented to remake the Middle East. The "transformation of Iraqi society" would be a model and guide for the subsequent transformation of Arab society en masse, they enthused. Ecstatically, they spoke of how first the Iraqis, then other Arabs, would learn of civil society, and how it could lift them out of the morass in which they found themselves.

The criticism of Iraqi and Arab society was based on pity and academic disdain, rather than vitriol and hostility. The Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula were pointed to as special examples of a blighted society in desperate need of uplifting. These "artificial societies" were regarded as the worst example of what dark turns Arab culture could take. The diners eagerly convinced each other that Arab culture and society needed a sharp and devastating blow that would "shock and awe" them, so that the English-speaking West could get its attention. They also assumed that after its liberation, a supine Iraqi population, unshackled from its old political masters, would lie quietly while American academics worked their magic and miraculously presented them with a new society.

Their reasons were not the ones proffered to the US public. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz confessed to Vanity Fair magazine that the weapons of mass destruction claims were a useful "bureaucratic argument", and "the one issue everyone could agree on". As has been revealed in recent books by former White House anti-terrorism coordinator Richard Clarke and insider journalist Bob Woodward, the war against Iraq had been on the minds of administration planners probably long before September 11, 2001. The attacks on that day only provided a fillip, allowing the execution of their plans to remake the Middle East. Since the US public could not be sold on a scheme of grand social revision, the marketing strategy relied on fear, and the various imminent threats that Saddam Hussein allegedly posed.

A year after this bold new strategy was embarked upon, it is worth examining how the neighborhood has been changed by the events of the past 12 months. Recall that the goal was the transformation of Middle Eastern society, and not mere regime change in one state. When the United States invaded Iraq, it had the unequivocal support of just two Arab states - Kuwait and Qatar. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided surreptitious support in the form of clandestine facilities or discreet overflight, but no commitment of troops or open use of facilities. Kuwait and Qatar were the indispensable launching pads for the ground and air war that was quickly concluded.

No one in the US asked the Gulf states what their expectations were about this military adventure. They went along individually with great reluctance because their fear of the US overcame their fear of the adverse reaction of their publics (Kuwait always being the exception). They were also not united in their views of the US intention to invade Iraq.

Saudi Arabia's attitude was the most complex. On the one hand, Saudi nerves had still not recovered from the fact that 15 of the 19 perpetrators on September 11 were Saudi. Acts of terrorist violence in Saudi Arabia were limited in scope and directed mostly at the US presence, but fear that violence could expand (as it later did) remained a constant worry. The al-Saud royal family had to straddle a contradiction. Supporting the Americans was an essential element of recovering from the damage of September 11 and the wave of attacks from prominent US commentators, especially the neo-conservatives who dominated the administration of President George W Bush. On the other hand, the al-Saud were equally conscious of the fact that Osama bin Laden and his sympathizers had used that very same close relationship with the United States to undermine the credibility of the ruling family. The tortured and twisted manifestation of support for the US action was the only possible way out of the dilemma.

Kuwait's attitudes were more straightforward. Iraq had threatened the existence of the Kuwaiti state in one form or another since before it became fully independent. Only a decade before, Iraq had invaded and pillaged Kuwait. Kuwaitis of almost every political persuasion still saw Iraq as a permanent threat and could be counted on to allow their government openly to support the US action. Bahrain had its own reasons for supporting the Americans, not least because the US already enjoyed the committed support of Bahrain's arch-rival, Qatar. The Bahraini majority underclass was solidly Shi'ite and hated Saddam for what he done to the Shi'ites of Iraq. Combined with the feeling that the US military presence was essential to the survival of the al-Khalifah family, this Shi'ite attitude propelled Bahrain to support the Americans, albeit with some superficial reservations.

The UAE saw supporting the Americans as unpopular, but at a level easily containable. Abu Dhabi did its utmost to mask the full extent of support for the Americans.

Qatar supported the United States as forthrightly as the Kuwaitis, but with a special twist. Qatar views a US presence as a necessary component of a national-security strategy. The Americans can deter any foreign enemy. The Qatari state also believes that it has managed to ensure domestic tranquility and popular support by encouraging modernization through political and social freedoms, combined with a clever diplomatic position that stakes out independence from the US. Qatar made its air, land and seas facilities fully available to the Americans, even to the point of hosting the US military's headquarters for the attack. At the same time, Qatari spokesmen took pains to offer public advice to the Americans on how misguided many of Washington's policies were. To its population, the government explained that Qatar's international obligations, especially to the United Nations, made its impossible for the state to do anything but support the Americans.

Transformation, what transformation?
What is wrong with this picture? The Americans saw the invasion of Iraq as a transcendental moment of transformation that would bring the region to democracy and free trade. The Gulf states saw the US action in what can be described as purely realpolitik terms. It is worth asking, however, where does the transformation of the Middle East stand today? The stated intent was simply to transform and reinvent Iraqi society so that it would serve as a shining beacon to the rest of the region and stand as a strong ally to a broader US plan to solve the problems of the entire region.

The planners expected that the Iraqi people would rally to the United States and deliver themselves into the caring US arms to await the transformation. They thought their anointed exile leader would quickly seize control and maintain order. Instead, the place fell apart so rapidly that the planners could not change their plans to accommodate the disaster.

Mobs looted the entire national infrastructure while US troops stood by haplessly, hobbled by the fact that their leadership had made no provision for a course of action that would change its troops from liberators to order-imposing occupiers. Having failed to catch the first clue that things were not as they had hoped them to be, they proceeded with their original plan to decapitate the military, political and economic structure of the country at the ankles.

Now they stand more or less in control of a country seething with resentment and on the verge of open insurrection, and still without a plan in sight. No wonder President Bush launched the Greater Middle East peace initiative as a separate action; achieving his long-term goals of democratizing the region would not happen from within Iraq.

The Gulf states are themselves in a state of shock at the way in which the operation in Iraq has gone bad. They did not necessarily believe in the high-minded and long-winded US plans to transform Iraqi society. They did expect that the United States would apply enough of its military, economic and diplomatic hyper-power to ensure that Iraq would stay quiescent. They were astounded at the series of mistakes the Americans made. New fissures are appearing in the US relationship with the Gulf. US leaders across the political spectrum continue to lambaste the Saudi regime as a breeder of terrorism. Bush cannot even impose his awesome political discipline on his own administration in this regard.

Qatar, which has openly offered to turn itself into the Americans' principal bastion in the region, finds itself on the receiving end of a vitriolic US attack on the basic institution of democracy: uncensored media. Despite the fact that Qatar today hosts enormous US military forces and has committed to financial and political support for US activities in Iraq, it has been given the diplomatic equivalent of the back of the American hand over Aljazeera satellite television. Exciting news, presented with the slant that satisfies the lowest common denominator in its audience and with a very loose hold on accuracy, has made Aljazeera the most popular Arabic medium on the globe. In the midst of a US campaign to foster democracy in the Middle East, it conveys to the world a message that Middle Eastern democracy need not include a free press.

The disenchantment with US policies is affecting its business relationships as well. Before September 11, the Saudis had decided to open their natural-gas fields to foreign development. US companies were at the front of a list of companies invited to participate. After the Iraqi invasion, work that had been suspended was reopened. Contracts were awarded to three companies, none of them American. Saudis have been boycotting US companies and their students have stopped registering in US universities. An important cultural bridge has been destroyed. Gulf businessmen are also afraid of visiting the United States, fearing the intrusive interrogations and resenting the humiliations to which they are exposed on entry. Instead of promoting a dialogue of civilizations, they have finally concretized the clash of civilizations. Wars started to end terror have, according to US intelligence officials, increased al-Qaeda recruitment tenfold.

Within Iraq, a population that was initially inclined to be patient and observe US intentions for it is increasingly joining a popular resistance. Sunnis and Shi'ites, once on the verge of civil war, are now united in their opposition to the occupation, and their militias cooperate with each other, sending supplies and words of encouragement. Fallujah became a rallying cry for Iraqis, the first victory against the occupation, the first liberated city. Posters on Iraqi walls announce that "Fallujah is the beginning of the end of the occupation". From a hotel room in Baghdad, waiting to hear the next explosion, one cannot help but wonder whether Iraq is the beginning of the end of the American empire.

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